总裁股权激励的投资者定价
总裁股权激励的投资者定价[20200907171454]
JeffP.Boone,InderK.Khurana,K.K.Raman
摘要:本论文的主要目的是探讨首席执行官以股票和期权形式的报酬问题.首席执行官报酬调整的目的是通过优化调整首席执行官作为股东的利益,使首席执行官做出更多的投资决策(尽管有风险).然而,最近的研究表明,这些激励措施有重大弊端(例如,他们鼓动高管操纵对外公开的业绩,降低会计信息质量).鉴于积极的总裁股权激励效应和不良的信息质量效果之间的冲突,CEO股权激励是否增加公司价值"便成了I.个开放的实证问题的.我们看看,在I.IXIXII年至II00VII年间,总裁股权激励是否在公司发生特定事前,其定价高于股票风险溢价.在这I.时期,我们的分析控制在两个潜在的结构变化之中.首先是I.IXIXV年美国特拉华州最高法院的裁决,它增加了在美国特拉华州注册成立的公司在收购方面的保护(降低风险).第II个是II00II年颁布的萨班斯-奥克斯利法案,它影响着企业风险的承担,股权激励和盈余管理.总的来说,我们的研究结果表明,总裁的股权激励尽管是低信息质量的,但是它通过调整股权资本成本,提高了公司的价值.
I.介绍
以前的研究(例如,延森等人在II00IV年的研究;詹森和墨菲在I.IXIX0年的研究)认为,股权的补偿,即以股票和期权的形式的总裁薪酬补偿,为首席执行官提供了强大的动力,诱导他们采取行动,提高股东利益(通过投资更多的风险大,但净现值高的项目这种方式).换句话说,股权激励制度将有助于通过调整总裁与其他股东的利益,减少代理成本,除此之外,还有助于与投资者沟通,向他们阐述公司的目标是股东财富最大化这I.重要理念(霍尔和墨菲在II00III的研究).
然而,最近的研究声称,股权激励也有倒行逆施的I.面,或者说,也有不良的弊端.特别是,以股权激励为基础的薪酬补偿,使管理人员对该公司的股票价格更敏感,并可能为了提高他们的收益而去操纵公布的业绩,例如创建名义会议或歪曲收益基准(如分析师的预测),企图提高股票价格,以及他们的个人财富_投资于该公司的股票和期权(博格斯和菲利在II00VI年的研究;伯恩斯和凯迪亚II00VI年的研究,程沃菲尔德在II00V年的研究).换句话说,总裁股权激励可以对公开列报的会计信息的质量产生负面影响.正如别布丘克和弗瑞得(II00III)和詹森等人(II00IV)所指出的那样,通过助长不正当的财务报告激励措施和降低会计信息的质量,以股权为基础的薪酬制度是产生代理问题的来源,而不是I.种解决方案.
尽管存在由股权激励而推断出的这些不良影响,以股权为基础的薪酬制度仍然在总裁们的薪酬总额占重要份额.不过,考虑到积极的总裁股权激励效应和不良的会计信息质量效果之间的冲突,总裁股权激励制度是否能增加公司价值,成为I.个开放的实证问题.据我们所知,以前的研究提供了有关该问题的不同方面的证据.例如,迈赫兰(I.IXIXV)研究I.IXVIIIX年至I.IXVIII0年的薪酬数据,并认为股权报酬与公司的托宾Q指数呈正相关.与此相反,阿布德(I.IXIXVI)研究了某公司从I.IXVIII0年到I.IXIX0年有关薪酬的样本数据,并发现尚未行使购股权价值和公司的股价呈负相关.这表明稀释效应在股票期权激励效果中占主导地位.此外,这两个研究都以前(即I.IXIXI.年之前)的数据.
在我们的研究中,我们研究是否总裁股权激励与该公司特定的事前股权风险溢价,即该公司超额的事前无风险利率权益资本(达利瓦等人在II00VI年研究的I.种度量)有关.与考尔和瓜伊(II00II)I.致,我们计算总裁股权激励在股票和期权的投资组合中,股票价格每变动百分之I.的敏感性.以某公司观察期超过I.VI年(I.IXIXII-II00VII)的样本为基础,我们发现总裁股权激励与公司的事前股权风险溢价呈负相关,这由此表明了积极的股权激励效果主导了较低的信息质量这I.不良影响.
在其他的分析中,我们试图控制为两个常规(结构方面)的变化,这些变化在我们I.IXIXII年至II00VII年的研究期间发生过.正如戴恩斯(II00I.)指出的那样,结构变化可能对公司价值.回报,以及行政补偿的结构有影响.首先,劳尔(II00IX)发现,继I.IXIXV年特拉华州最高法院的裁决造成了更大的收购保护以来,经理用拒绝高风险的投资项目(虽然净现值是正的)这种方式来降低公司的风险.相应的,公司增加总裁的股权激励,以减轻风险规避.也许,特拉 *好棒文|www.hbsrm.com +Q: ^3^5`1^9`1^6^0`7^2#
华州最高法院的关于经理人风险规避的裁决而产生的影响,和后续股权激励的增加(目的是减轻经理人风险规避的可能性)可能导致我们研究的样本中的企业,至少在特拉华州的企业的结构变革.为了控制这种潜在的结构方面的影响,我们分别根据I.IXIXVI年至II00VII年在美国特拉华州注册成立的公司做研究分析.我们的研究结果表明,总裁股权激励对公司价值(如在事前降低股权风险溢价时反映)产生的有利影响与特拉华州的公司以及其他公司相似.
其次,许多研究(例如,科恩等人在II00VII年和II00VIII年的研究;李等人在II00VIII年的研究)表明,II00II年颁布的萨班斯-奥克斯利法案降低了股权激励(即降低了股权激励占报酬总额的比例),降低了管理风险承担,降低研发支出和资本支出,以及降低应计盈余管理,同时提高实际盈余管理.由于实际盈余管理对投资者来说可能比权责发生制基础下盈余管理更为困难,萨班斯法案的I.个可能产生的后果就是自II00II年以来,代理成本增加.为了控制由萨班斯法案带来的,无论在预期收益方面,还是股权激励水平方面表现出的潜在的结构变化,我们分别对萨班斯法案颁布前和颁布后的时间段做了分析.通过对这两个时间段的分析,我们的结果证明了,对的总裁股权激励制度对公司价值(如在事前降低股权风险溢价时反映)有积极的影响,但这积极作用似乎是在萨班斯法案颁布后发挥得更强.
我们的研究对于股权激励估值方面的著作有显著贡献.我们提供(据我们所知)最新的有关总裁股权激励和事前权益资本成本之间的关系的证据.先前的研究目前大多数都集中在股权激励管理对公司绩效产生后果方面(迈赫兰在I.IXIXV年的研究;安隆等人在II00III的研究)和风险承担方面(赖吉哥保和谢夫林在II00II年的研究;科尔斯等人在II00VI年的研究;安隆等人在II00IV年的研究),而不是估值本身.如前所述,据我们所知,之前只有两个研究(埃布德在I.IXIXVI年的研究和迈赫兰在I.IXIXV年的研究,都以I.IXIXI.年之前的数据为基础)探讨过股权激励管理的定价问题,其结果是喜忧参半.
在我们的研究中,我们提供关于总裁股权激励估值影响的证据,而他们更多以近期(I.IXIXII-II00VII)数据为基础.通过集中审视这些近期数据,我们的发现涉及到I.条不断攀升的,有关股权补偿和会计信息质量的关联线.具体来说,科菲(II00IV)表明,国会于I.IXIXIII年颁布了I.项规定,即对高管I.百美元的现金补偿局限于扣除的税额,以此来激励公司更有效的运用股权激励制度.反过来,这也增加了管理人员对公司股价的敏感性.博格和菲利(II00VI).程和沃菲尔德(II00V)提供的证据表明,股权激励与权责发生制为基础的盈余管理呈正相关.同样,伯恩和凯迪亚(II00VI),以及爱芬迪等人(II00VII)的报告表明,总裁股权激励与会计违规和随后的重述财务报表呈正相关.因此,以前的研究表明,股权的补偿,对公司报告的盈余质量有负面影响.与I.些已经发表的实证研究I.致,也支持这I.观点,即较低的信息质量是因为有I.个较高的股权资本成本(例如,巴特查亚等人在II00III年的研究;弗朗西斯等人在II00V年的研究),总裁股权激励有可能通过增加企业特有的股权风险溢价,降低公司价值.
如前所述,我们的研究中,总裁股权激励与公司的事前股权风险溢价呈负相关(尽管相关性低),这意味着股权激励通过降低公司的股权资本成本来抬高公司价值.因此,我们研究显示,积极的股权激励效果主导了较低的信息质量这I.不良影响.
自I.IXIXII年以来,美国证券交易委员会(SEC)已授权公开披露高管薪酬数据,以促进投资者做出明智的决定.我们的研究结果进I.步证明,这些披露提高了在激烈竞争的证券市场下的股票价格的信息含量.总的来说,考虑到总裁薪酬是大众I.直感兴趣的话题(詹森等人在II00IV年的研究;莱希等人在II00VII年的研究),我们的研究结果表明,通过股权资本成本这I.渠道,总裁股权激励制度对公司价值起积极作用.
II结语
以前的研究(例如,高盛和斯里萨克在II00VI年的研究;詹森等人在II00IV的研究)认为,总裁股权激励是I.把双刃剑.I.方面,这些激励措施可以通过调整总裁与其他股东的利益的减少两者争端(即,通过激励总裁们做出更加优化.低风险的投资决策).另I.方面,这些激励措施可能导致高管对股价的过度敏感性,诱导高管操纵股票价格.换言之,通过奖励措施,激励了总裁优化决策,也降低了与投资者定价决策相关的会计信息质量,总裁股权激励有可能成为I.部分,而不全是代理问题的补救措施.然而,据我们所知,事先并没有证据显示其效果,即积极的股权激励效果主导了较低的信息质量这I.不良影响.
我们致力于以下几个方面的研究.首先,我们证明了总裁股权激励与公司的特定股权风险溢价呈负相关,即在特定的事前股权风险溢价,积极的股权激励效果主导了较低的信息质量这I.不良影响.其次,由于股权激励的目的是促使总裁们做出更优的投资决策(虽然有风险),对股东股权激励制度在萨班斯法案颁布后I.段时间对股东财富的影响特别受人关注.我们的研究结果证明了这些激励措施的经济意义(即股东在I.个较低的事前股票风险溢价和较高的公司价值时的回报额,其实??在萨班斯法案颁布后的时间内提高了).最后,我们的发现进I.步证明,美国证券交易委员会规定披露的高管薪酬数据(自I.IXIXII年起)提高了关于权益资本成本的信息质量和企业价值,这些是总裁股权激励产生的潜在影响.如今,总裁薪酬是监管机构和投资者持续感兴趣的话题(詹森等人在II00IV年的研究;莱希在II00VII年的研究).总的来说,我们的发现补充并扩展关于股权激励的以前的研究.当有关监管机构和投资者存在针对总裁股权激励对股东财富造成的可能后果产生疑问时,我们的研究成果可能非常有用.
附件II:外文原文(复印件)
InvestorpricingofCEOequityincentives
JeffP.Boone,InderK.Khurana,K.K.Raman
Abstract
ThemainpurposeofthispaperistoexploreCEOcompensationintheformofstockandoptions.TheobjectiveofCEOcompensationistobetteralignCEO-shareholderinterestsbyinducingCEOstomakemoreoptimal(albeitrisky)investmentdecisions.However,recentresearchsuggeststhattheseincentiveshaveasignificantdown-side(i.e.,theymotivateexecutivestomanipulatereportedearningsandlowerinformationquality).GiventheconflictbetweenthepositiveCEO-shareholderincentivealignmenteffectandthedysfunctionalinformationqualityeffect,itisanopenempiricalquestionwhetherCEOequityincentivesincreasefirmvalue.WeexaminewhetherCEOequityincentivesarepricedinthefirm-specificexanteequityriskpremiumovertheI.IXIXII–II00VIItimeperiod.Ouranalysiscontrolsfortwopotentialstructuralchangesoverthistimeperiod.ThefirstistheI.IXIXVDelawareSupremeCourtrulingwhichincreasedprotectionfromtakeovers(anddecreasedrisk)forDelawareincorporatedfirms.ThesecondistheII00IISarbanes–OxleyActwhichimpactedcorporaterisktaking,equityincentives,andearningsmanagement.Collectively,ourfindingssuggestthatCEOequityincentives,despitebeingassociatedwithlowerinformationquality,increasefirmvaluethroughacostofequitycapitalchannel.
Introduction
Inthisstudy,weinvestigateinvestorpricingofCEOequityincentivesforalargesampleofUSfirmsovertheperiodI.IXIXII–II00VII.BecauseincentivesembeddedinCEOcompensationcontractsmaybeexpectedtoinfluencepolicychoicesatthefirmlevel,ourobjectiveistoexaminewhetherCEOequityincentivesinfluencefirmvaluethroughacostofequitycapitalchannel.
Priorresearch(e.g.,Jensenetal.II00IV;JensenandMurphyI.IXIX0)suggeststhatequity-basedcompensation,i.e.,CEOcompensationintheformofstockandoptions,providestheCEOapowerfulinducementtotakeactionstoincreaseshareholdervalue(byinvestinginmoreriskybutpositivenetpresentvalueprojects).Putdifferently,equityincentivesareexpectedtohelpmitigateagencycostsbyaligningtheinterestsoftheCEOwiththoseoftheshareholders,andotherwisehelpcommunicatetoinvestorstheimportantideathatthefirm’sobjectiveistomaximizeshareholderwealth(HallandMurphyII00III).
However,recentresearchcontendsthatequityincentivesalsohaveaperverseordysfunctionaldownside.Inparticular,equity-basedcompensationmakesmanagersmoresensitivetothefirm’sstockprice,andincreasestheirincentivetomanipulatereportedearnings_i.e.,tocreatetheappearanceofmeetingorbeatingearningsbenchmarks(suchasanalysts’forecasts)_inanattempttobolsterthestockpriceandtheirpersonalwealthinvestedinthefirm’sstockandoptions(BergstresserandPhilipponII00VI;BurnsandKediaII00VI;ChengandWarfieldII00V).Statedinanotherway,CEOequityincentivescanhaveanadverseeffectonthequalityofreportedaccountinginformation.AsnotedbyBebchukandFried(II00III)andJensenetal.(II00IV),bypromotingperversefinancialreportingincentivesandloweringthequalityofaccountinginformation,equity-basedcompensationcanbeasourceof,ratherthanasolutionfor,theagencyproblem.
Despitetheseargumentsabouttheputativeilleffectsofequityincentives,equity-basedcompensationcontinuestobeasalientcomponentofthetotalpaypackagesforCEOs.Still,giventheconflictbetweenthepositiveincentivealignmenteffectandthedysfunctionaleffectoflowerinformationquality,itisanopenempiricalquestionwhetherCEOequityincentivesincreasefirmvalue.Toourknowledge,priorresearchprovidesmixedevidenceonthisissue.Forexample,Mehran(I.IXIXV)examinesI.IXVIIIX–I.IXVIII0compensationdataandfindsthatequity-basedcompensationispositivelyrelatedtothefirm’sTobin’sQ.Bycontrast,Aboody(I.IXIXVI)examinescompensationdataforasampleoffirmsforyearsI.IXVIII0throughI.IXIX0,andfindsanegativecorrelationbetweenthevalueofoutstandingoptionsandthefirm’sshareprice,suggestingthatthedilutioneffectdominatestheoptions’incentivealignmenteffect.Moreover,boththesestudiesarebasedondated(i.e.,pre-I.IXIXI.)data.
Inourstudy,weexaminewhetherCEOequityincentivesarerelatedtothefirm-specificexanteequityriskpremium,i.e.,theexcessofthefirm’sexantecostofequitycapitalovertherisk-freeinterestrate(ametricdiscussedbyDhaliwaletal.II00VI).ConsistentwithCoreandGuay(II00II),wemeasureCEOequityincentivesasthesensitivityoftheCEO’sstockandoptionportfoliotoaI.percentchangeinthestockprice.BasedonasampleofI.VI,V0IIfirm-yearobservationsoveraI.VIyearperiod(I.IXIXII–II00VII),wefindCEOequityincentivestobenegativelyrelatedtothefirm’sexanteequityriskpremium,suggestingthatthepositiveincentivealignmenteffectdominatesthedysfunctionaleffectoflowerinformationquality.
Inotheranalysis,weattempttocontrolfortworegulatory(structural)changesthatoccurredduringtheI.IXIXII–II00VIItimeperiodofourstudy.AspointedoutbyDaines(II00I.),regulatorychangescanhaveanimpactonfirmvaluesandreturnsaswellasthestructureofexecutivecompensation.First,Low(II00IX)findsthatfollowingtheIXVDelawareSupremeCourtrulingthatresultedingreatertakeoverprotection,managersreducedfirmriskbyturningdownrisk-increasing(albeitpositiveNPV)projects.Inresponse,firmsincreasedCEOequityincentivestomitigatetheriskaversion.Potentially,theimpactoftheDelawarerulingonmanagers’riskaversionandthefollow-upincreaseinequityincentives(tomitigatetheincreaseinmanagers’riskaversionfollowingtheruling)mayhaveresultedinastructuralchangeinoursampleatleastforfirmsincorporatedinDelaware.Tocontrolforthispotentialstructuralimpact,weperformouranalysisforDelawareincorporatedfirmsforI.IXIXVI–II00VIIseparately.OurresultssuggestthatthefavorableeffectofCEOequityincentivesonfirmvalue(asreflectedinthelowerexanteequityriskpremium)issimilarforDelawarefirmsandotherfirms.
Second,anumberofstudies(e.g.,Cohenetal.II00VII,II00VIII;Lietal.II00VIII)indicatethattheII00IISarbanes–OxleyAct(SOX)loweredequityincentives(i.e.,reducedtheproportionofequityincentivestototalcompensationpost-SOX),reducedmanagerialrisktaking,decreasedspendingonR&Dandcapitalexpenditures,andreducedaccruals-basedearningsmanagementwhileincreasingrealearningsmanagement.Sincerealearningsmanagementispotentiallymoredifficultforinvestorstodetectthanaccruals-basedearningsmanagement,apossibleconsequenceofSOXcouldbeanincreaseinagencycostssinceII00II.TocontrolforthepotentialstructuralchangesimposedbySOXbothintermsofexpectedreturnsandthelevelofequityincentives,weperformouranalysisforthepre-SOXandpost-SOXtimeperiodsseparately.Foreachofthetwotimeperiods,ourresultssuggestafavorableeffectofCEOequityincentivesonfirmvalue(asreflectedinthelowerexanteequityriskpremium),althoughtheeffectappearstobestrongerinthepost-SOXperiod.
Ourstudycontributestotheliteratureonthevaluationofequityincentives.Weprovide(toourknowledge)first-timeevidenceontherelationbetweenCEOequityincentivesandtheexantecostofequitycapital.Priorresearchhasfocusedbyandlargeontheconsequencesofmanagerialequityincentivesforfirmperformance(MehranI.IXIXV;Hanlonetal.II00III)andrisktaking(RajgopalandShevlinII00II;Colesetal.II00VI;Hanlonetal.II00IV)ratherthanonvaluationperse.Asnotedpreviously,toourknowledgeonlytwopriorstudies(AboodyI.IXIXVIandMehranI.IXIXV,bothbasedonpre-I.IXIXI.data)haveexaminedthepricingofmanagerialequityincentives,withmixedresults.
Inourstudy,weprovideevidenceonthevaluationeffectsofCEOequityincentivesbasedonmorerecent(I.IXIXII–II00VII)data.Byfocusingonmorerecentdata,ourfindingsrelatetoagrowinglineofresearchontheassociationbetweenequity-basedcompensationandaccountinginformationquality.Specifically,Coffee(II00IV)suggeststhatthe$I.millionlimitonthetaxdeductibilityofcashcompensationforseniorexecutivesimposedbyCongressinI.IXIXIIImotivatedfirmstomakegreateruseofequitycompensationwhich,inturn,increasedthesensitivityofmanagerstothefirm’sstockprice.BergstresserandPhilippon(II00VI)andChengandWarfield(II00V)provideevidencewhichsuggeststhatequityincentivesarepositivelyrelatedtothemagnitudeofaccruals-basedearningsmanagement.Similarly,BurnsandKedia(II00VI)andEfendietal.(II00VII)reportCEOequityincentivestobepositivelyrelatedtoaccountingirregularitiesandthesubsequentrestatementofpreviouslyissuedfinancialstatements.Thus,priorresearchsuggeststhatequity-basedcompensationhasanegativeeffectonthequalityofearningsreportedbyfirms.Consistentwithseveralpublishedempiricalstudiesthatsupportthenotionthatlowerinformationqualityispricedinahighercostofequitycapital(e.g.,Bhattacharyaetal.II00III;Francisetal.II00V),CEOequityincentivescouldpotentiallylowerfirmvaluebyincreasingthefirm-specificequityriskpremium.
Asnotedpreviously,wedocumentthatCEOequityincentives(despitetheassociatedlowerinformationquality)arerelatednegativelytothefirm’sexanteequityriskpremium,implyingthatequityincentivesincreasefirmvaluebyloweringthefirm’scostofequitycapital.Thus,ourfindingssuggestthatthepositiveCEO-shareholderincentivealignmenteffectassociatedwithequityincentivesdominatesthedysfunctionalinformationqualityeffect.
SinceI.IXIXII,theSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)hasmandatedthepublicdisclosureofexecutivecompensationdatatopromoteinformeddecisionmakingbyinvestors.Our?ndingsprovidefurtherevidencethatthesedisclosuresincreasetheinformativenessofstockpricesincompetitivesecuritiesmarkets.Collectively,giventhatCEOcompensationisatopicofongoinginterest(Jensenetal.II00IV;ReichII00VII),our?ndingsindicatethatCEOequityincentivesin?uence?rmvaluefavorablythroughacostofequitycapitalchannel.
Concludingremarks
Priorresearch(e.g.,GoldmanandSlezakII00VI;Jensenetal.II00IV)suggeststhatCEOequityincentivescanbeadouble-edgedsword.Ontheonehand,theseincentivescanmitigatetheagencyproblembyaligningtheinterestsoftheCEOwiththoseoftheshareholders(i.e.,byinducingCEOstoprefermoreoptimal,albeitrisky,investmentchoices).Ontheotherhand,theseincentivescanleadtoexcessivesensitivitytosharepriceperformanceandinduceexecutivestomanipulatereportedearningswithaneyeonthestockprice.Inotherwords,bypromotingperversereportingincentivesandloweringthequalityofaccountinginformationpertinenttoinvestorpricingdecisions,CEOequityincentivescanpotentiallybeapartof,notaremedyfor,theagencyproblem.However,toourknowledgethereislittletonopriorevidencetosuggestwhicheffect_thepositiveincentivealignmenteffectortheperverseinformationqualityeffect_dominates.
Wecontributetotheliteratureinseveralways.First,weshowthatCEOequityincentivesarenegativelyrelatedtothefirm-specificequityriskpremium,i.e.,thepositiveincentivealignmenteffectassociatedwiththeseincentivesdominatesthedysfunctionalinformationqualityeffectinthepricingofthefirm-specificexanteequityriskpremium.Second,sinceequityincentivesareintendedtoinduceCEOstomakemoreoptimal(albeitrisky)investmentdecisions,theeffectoftheseincentivesonshareholderwealthinthepost-SOXtimeperiodisofparticularinterest.Ourresultssuggestthattheeconomicsignificanceoftheseincentives(i.e.,thepayoffforshareholdersintermsofalowerexanteequityriskpremiumandahigherfirmvalue)wasinfacthigherinthepost-SOXtimeperiod.Finally,ourfindingsprovidefurtherevidencethattheSECmandateddisclosures(sinceI.IXIXII)ofexecutivecompensationdataincreasestheinformativenessofstockpriceswithrespecttothepotentialimplicationsofCEOequityincentivesforthecostofequitycapitalandfirmvalue.Atthistime,CEOcompensationisatopicofongoinginterestforregulatorsandinvestors(Jensenetal.II00IV;ReichII00VII).Collectively,ourfindingscomplementandextendpriorresearchonequityincentives.TheyarepotentiallyusefulinbetterinformingregulatorsandinvestorsfacedwithquestionsaboutthepossibleconsequencesofCEOequityincentivesforshareholderwealth.
JeffP.Boone,InderK.Khurana,K.K.Raman
摘要:本论文的主要目的是探讨首席执行官以股票和期权形式的报酬问题.首席执行官报酬调整的目的是通过优化调整首席执行官作为股东的利益,使首席执行官做出更多的投资决策(尽管有风险).然而,最近的研究表明,这些激励措施有重大弊端(例如,他们鼓动高管操纵对外公开的业绩,降低会计信息质量).鉴于积极的总裁股权激励效应和不良的信息质量效果之间的冲突,CEO股权激励是否增加公司价值"便成了I.个开放的实证问题的.我们看看,在I.IXIXII年至II00VII年间,总裁股权激励是否在公司发生特定事前,其定价高于股票风险溢价.在这I.时期,我们的分析控制在两个潜在的结构变化之中.首先是I.IXIXV年美国特拉华州最高法院的裁决,它增加了在美国特拉华州注册成立的公司在收购方面的保护(降低风险).第II个是II00II年颁布的萨班斯-奥克斯利法案,它影响着企业风险的承担,股权激励和盈余管理.总的来说,我们的研究结果表明,总裁的股权激励尽管是低信息质量的,但是它通过调整股权资本成本,提高了公司的价值.
I.介绍
以前的研究(例如,延森等人在II00IV年的研究;詹森和墨菲在I.IXIX0年的研究)认为,股权的补偿,即以股票和期权的形式的总裁薪酬补偿,为首席执行官提供了强大的动力,诱导他们采取行动,提高股东利益(通过投资更多的风险大,但净现值高的项目这种方式).换句话说,股权激励制度将有助于通过调整总裁与其他股东的利益,减少代理成本,除此之外,还有助于与投资者沟通,向他们阐述公司的目标是股东财富最大化这I.重要理念(霍尔和墨菲在II00III的研究).
然而,最近的研究声称,股权激励也有倒行逆施的I.面,或者说,也有不良的弊端.特别是,以股权激励为基础的薪酬补偿,使管理人员对该公司的股票价格更敏感,并可能为了提高他们的收益而去操纵公布的业绩,例如创建名义会议或歪曲收益基准(如分析师的预测),企图提高股票价格,以及他们的个人财富_投资于该公司的股票和期权(博格斯和菲利在II00VI年的研究;伯恩斯和凯迪亚II00VI年的研究,程沃菲尔德在II00V年的研究).换句话说,总裁股权激励可以对公开列报的会计信息的质量产生负面影响.正如别布丘克和弗瑞得(II00III)和詹森等人(II00IV)所指出的那样,通过助长不正当的财务报告激励措施和降低会计信息的质量,以股权为基础的薪酬制度是产生代理问题的来源,而不是I.种解决方案.
尽管存在由股权激励而推断出的这些不良影响,以股权为基础的薪酬制度仍然在总裁们的薪酬总额占重要份额.不过,考虑到积极的总裁股权激励效应和不良的会计信息质量效果之间的冲突,总裁股权激励制度是否能增加公司价值,成为I.个开放的实证问题.据我们所知,以前的研究提供了有关该问题的不同方面的证据.例如,迈赫兰(I.IXIXV)研究I.IXVIIIX年至I.IXVIII0年的薪酬数据,并认为股权报酬与公司的托宾Q指数呈正相关.与此相反,阿布德(I.IXIXVI)研究了某公司从I.IXVIII0年到I.IXIX0年有关薪酬的样本数据,并发现尚未行使购股权价值和公司的股价呈负相关.这表明稀释效应在股票期权激励效果中占主导地位.此外,这两个研究都以前(即I.IXIXI.年之前)的数据.
在我们的研究中,我们研究是否总裁股权激励与该公司特定的事前股权风险溢价,即该公司超额的事前无风险利率权益资本(达利瓦等人在II00VI年研究的I.种度量)有关.与考尔和瓜伊(II00II)I.致,我们计算总裁股权激励在股票和期权的投资组合中,股票价格每变动百分之I.的敏感性.以某公司观察期超过I.VI年(I.IXIXII-II00VII)的样本为基础,我们发现总裁股权激励与公司的事前股权风险溢价呈负相关,这由此表明了积极的股权激励效果主导了较低的信息质量这I.不良影响.
在其他的分析中,我们试图控制为两个常规(结构方面)的变化,这些变化在我们I.IXIXII年至II00VII年的研究期间发生过.正如戴恩斯(II00I.)指出的那样,结构变化可能对公司价值.回报,以及行政补偿的结构有影响.首先,劳尔(II00IX)发现,继I.IXIXV年特拉华州最高法院的裁决造成了更大的收购保护以来,经理用拒绝高风险的投资项目(虽然净现值是正的)这种方式来降低公司的风险.相应的,公司增加总裁的股权激励,以减轻风险规避.也许,特拉 *好棒文|www.hbsrm.com +Q: ^3^5`1^9`1^6^0`7^2#
华州最高法院的关于经理人风险规避的裁决而产生的影响,和后续股权激励的增加(目的是减轻经理人风险规避的可能性)可能导致我们研究的样本中的企业,至少在特拉华州的企业的结构变革.为了控制这种潜在的结构方面的影响,我们分别根据I.IXIXVI年至II00VII年在美国特拉华州注册成立的公司做研究分析.我们的研究结果表明,总裁股权激励对公司价值(如在事前降低股权风险溢价时反映)产生的有利影响与特拉华州的公司以及其他公司相似.
其次,许多研究(例如,科恩等人在II00VII年和II00VIII年的研究;李等人在II00VIII年的研究)表明,II00II年颁布的萨班斯-奥克斯利法案降低了股权激励(即降低了股权激励占报酬总额的比例),降低了管理风险承担,降低研发支出和资本支出,以及降低应计盈余管理,同时提高实际盈余管理.由于实际盈余管理对投资者来说可能比权责发生制基础下盈余管理更为困难,萨班斯法案的I.个可能产生的后果就是自II00II年以来,代理成本增加.为了控制由萨班斯法案带来的,无论在预期收益方面,还是股权激励水平方面表现出的潜在的结构变化,我们分别对萨班斯法案颁布前和颁布后的时间段做了分析.通过对这两个时间段的分析,我们的结果证明了,对的总裁股权激励制度对公司价值(如在事前降低股权风险溢价时反映)有积极的影响,但这积极作用似乎是在萨班斯法案颁布后发挥得更强.
我们的研究对于股权激励估值方面的著作有显著贡献.我们提供(据我们所知)最新的有关总裁股权激励和事前权益资本成本之间的关系的证据.先前的研究目前大多数都集中在股权激励管理对公司绩效产生后果方面(迈赫兰在I.IXIXV年的研究;安隆等人在II00III的研究)和风险承担方面(赖吉哥保和谢夫林在II00II年的研究;科尔斯等人在II00VI年的研究;安隆等人在II00IV年的研究),而不是估值本身.如前所述,据我们所知,之前只有两个研究(埃布德在I.IXIXVI年的研究和迈赫兰在I.IXIXV年的研究,都以I.IXIXI.年之前的数据为基础)探讨过股权激励管理的定价问题,其结果是喜忧参半.
在我们的研究中,我们提供关于总裁股权激励估值影响的证据,而他们更多以近期(I.IXIXII-II00VII)数据为基础.通过集中审视这些近期数据,我们的发现涉及到I.条不断攀升的,有关股权补偿和会计信息质量的关联线.具体来说,科菲(II00IV)表明,国会于I.IXIXIII年颁布了I.项规定,即对高管I.百美元的现金补偿局限于扣除的税额,以此来激励公司更有效的运用股权激励制度.反过来,这也增加了管理人员对公司股价的敏感性.博格和菲利(II00VI).程和沃菲尔德(II00V)提供的证据表明,股权激励与权责发生制为基础的盈余管理呈正相关.同样,伯恩和凯迪亚(II00VI),以及爱芬迪等人(II00VII)的报告表明,总裁股权激励与会计违规和随后的重述财务报表呈正相关.因此,以前的研究表明,股权的补偿,对公司报告的盈余质量有负面影响.与I.些已经发表的实证研究I.致,也支持这I.观点,即较低的信息质量是因为有I.个较高的股权资本成本(例如,巴特查亚等人在II00III年的研究;弗朗西斯等人在II00V年的研究),总裁股权激励有可能通过增加企业特有的股权风险溢价,降低公司价值.
如前所述,我们的研究中,总裁股权激励与公司的事前股权风险溢价呈负相关(尽管相关性低),这意味着股权激励通过降低公司的股权资本成本来抬高公司价值.因此,我们研究显示,积极的股权激励效果主导了较低的信息质量这I.不良影响.
自I.IXIXII年以来,美国证券交易委员会(SEC)已授权公开披露高管薪酬数据,以促进投资者做出明智的决定.我们的研究结果进I.步证明,这些披露提高了在激烈竞争的证券市场下的股票价格的信息含量.总的来说,考虑到总裁薪酬是大众I.直感兴趣的话题(詹森等人在II00IV年的研究;莱希等人在II00VII年的研究),我们的研究结果表明,通过股权资本成本这I.渠道,总裁股权激励制度对公司价值起积极作用.
II结语
以前的研究(例如,高盛和斯里萨克在II00VI年的研究;詹森等人在II00IV的研究)认为,总裁股权激励是I.把双刃剑.I.方面,这些激励措施可以通过调整总裁与其他股东的利益的减少两者争端(即,通过激励总裁们做出更加优化.低风险的投资决策).另I.方面,这些激励措施可能导致高管对股价的过度敏感性,诱导高管操纵股票价格.换言之,通过奖励措施,激励了总裁优化决策,也降低了与投资者定价决策相关的会计信息质量,总裁股权激励有可能成为I.部分,而不全是代理问题的补救措施.然而,据我们所知,事先并没有证据显示其效果,即积极的股权激励效果主导了较低的信息质量这I.不良影响.
我们致力于以下几个方面的研究.首先,我们证明了总裁股权激励与公司的特定股权风险溢价呈负相关,即在特定的事前股权风险溢价,积极的股权激励效果主导了较低的信息质量这I.不良影响.其次,由于股权激励的目的是促使总裁们做出更优的投资决策(虽然有风险),对股东股权激励制度在萨班斯法案颁布后I.段时间对股东财富的影响特别受人关注.我们的研究结果证明了这些激励措施的经济意义(即股东在I.个较低的事前股票风险溢价和较高的公司价值时的回报额,其实??在萨班斯法案颁布后的时间内提高了).最后,我们的发现进I.步证明,美国证券交易委员会规定披露的高管薪酬数据(自I.IXIXII年起)提高了关于权益资本成本的信息质量和企业价值,这些是总裁股权激励产生的潜在影响.如今,总裁薪酬是监管机构和投资者持续感兴趣的话题(詹森等人在II00IV年的研究;莱希在II00VII年的研究).总的来说,我们的发现补充并扩展关于股权激励的以前的研究.当有关监管机构和投资者存在针对总裁股权激励对股东财富造成的可能后果产生疑问时,我们的研究成果可能非常有用.
附件II:外文原文(复印件)
InvestorpricingofCEOequityincentives
JeffP.Boone,InderK.Khurana,K.K.Raman
Abstract
ThemainpurposeofthispaperistoexploreCEOcompensationintheformofstockandoptions.TheobjectiveofCEOcompensationistobetteralignCEO-shareholderinterestsbyinducingCEOstomakemoreoptimal(albeitrisky)investmentdecisions.However,recentresearchsuggeststhattheseincentiveshaveasignificantdown-side(i.e.,theymotivateexecutivestomanipulatereportedearningsandlowerinformationquality).GiventheconflictbetweenthepositiveCEO-shareholderincentivealignmenteffectandthedysfunctionalinformationqualityeffect,itisanopenempiricalquestionwhetherCEOequityincentivesincreasefirmvalue.WeexaminewhetherCEOequityincentivesarepricedinthefirm-specificexanteequityriskpremiumovertheI.IXIXII–II00VIItimeperiod.Ouranalysiscontrolsfortwopotentialstructuralchangesoverthistimeperiod.ThefirstistheI.IXIXVDelawareSupremeCourtrulingwhichincreasedprotectionfromtakeovers(anddecreasedrisk)forDelawareincorporatedfirms.ThesecondistheII00IISarbanes–OxleyActwhichimpactedcorporaterisktaking,equityincentives,andearningsmanagement.Collectively,ourfindingssuggestthatCEOequityincentives,despitebeingassociatedwithlowerinformationquality,increasefirmvaluethroughacostofequitycapitalchannel.
Introduction
Inthisstudy,weinvestigateinvestorpricingofCEOequityincentivesforalargesampleofUSfirmsovertheperiodI.IXIXII–II00VII.BecauseincentivesembeddedinCEOcompensationcontractsmaybeexpectedtoinfluencepolicychoicesatthefirmlevel,ourobjectiveistoexaminewhetherCEOequityincentivesinfluencefirmvaluethroughacostofequitycapitalchannel.
Priorresearch(e.g.,Jensenetal.II00IV;JensenandMurphyI.IXIX0)suggeststhatequity-basedcompensation,i.e.,CEOcompensationintheformofstockandoptions,providestheCEOapowerfulinducementtotakeactionstoincreaseshareholdervalue(byinvestinginmoreriskybutpositivenetpresentvalueprojects).Putdifferently,equityincentivesareexpectedtohelpmitigateagencycostsbyaligningtheinterestsoftheCEOwiththoseoftheshareholders,andotherwisehelpcommunicatetoinvestorstheimportantideathatthefirm’sobjectiveistomaximizeshareholderwealth(HallandMurphyII00III).
However,recentresearchcontendsthatequityincentivesalsohaveaperverseordysfunctionaldownside.Inparticular,equity-basedcompensationmakesmanagersmoresensitivetothefirm’sstockprice,andincreasestheirincentivetomanipulatereportedearnings_i.e.,tocreatetheappearanceofmeetingorbeatingearningsbenchmarks(suchasanalysts’forecasts)_inanattempttobolsterthestockpriceandtheirpersonalwealthinvestedinthefirm’sstockandoptions(BergstresserandPhilipponII00VI;BurnsandKediaII00VI;ChengandWarfieldII00V).Statedinanotherway,CEOequityincentivescanhaveanadverseeffectonthequalityofreportedaccountinginformation.AsnotedbyBebchukandFried(II00III)andJensenetal.(II00IV),bypromotingperversefinancialreportingincentivesandloweringthequalityofaccountinginformation,equity-basedcompensationcanbeasourceof,ratherthanasolutionfor,theagencyproblem.
Despitetheseargumentsabouttheputativeilleffectsofequityincentives,equity-basedcompensationcontinuestobeasalientcomponentofthetotalpaypackagesforCEOs.Still,giventheconflictbetweenthepositiveincentivealignmenteffectandthedysfunctionaleffectoflowerinformationquality,itisanopenempiricalquestionwhetherCEOequityincentivesincreasefirmvalue.Toourknowledge,priorresearchprovidesmixedevidenceonthisissue.Forexample,Mehran(I.IXIXV)examinesI.IXVIIIX–I.IXVIII0compensationdataandfindsthatequity-basedcompensationispositivelyrelatedtothefirm’sTobin’sQ.Bycontrast,Aboody(I.IXIXVI)examinescompensationdataforasampleoffirmsforyearsI.IXVIII0throughI.IXIX0,andfindsanegativecorrelationbetweenthevalueofoutstandingoptionsandthefirm’sshareprice,suggestingthatthedilutioneffectdominatestheoptions’incentivealignmenteffect.Moreover,boththesestudiesarebasedondated(i.e.,pre-I.IXIXI.)data.
Inourstudy,weexaminewhetherCEOequityincentivesarerelatedtothefirm-specificexanteequityriskpremium,i.e.,theexcessofthefirm’sexantecostofequitycapitalovertherisk-freeinterestrate(ametricdiscussedbyDhaliwaletal.II00VI).ConsistentwithCoreandGuay(II00II),wemeasureCEOequityincentivesasthesensitivityoftheCEO’sstockandoptionportfoliotoaI.percentchangeinthestockprice.BasedonasampleofI.VI,V0IIfirm-yearobservationsoveraI.VIyearperiod(I.IXIXII–II00VII),wefindCEOequityincentivestobenegativelyrelatedtothefirm’sexanteequityriskpremium,suggestingthatthepositiveincentivealignmenteffectdominatesthedysfunctionaleffectoflowerinformationquality.
Inotheranalysis,weattempttocontrolfortworegulatory(structural)changesthatoccurredduringtheI.IXIXII–II00VIItimeperiodofourstudy.AspointedoutbyDaines(II00I.),regulatorychangescanhaveanimpactonfirmvaluesandreturnsaswellasthestructureofexecutivecompensation.First,Low(II00IX)findsthatfollowingtheIXVDelawareSupremeCourtrulingthatresultedingreatertakeoverprotection,managersreducedfirmriskbyturningdownrisk-increasing(albeitpositiveNPV)projects.Inresponse,firmsincreasedCEOequityincentivestomitigatetheriskaversion.Potentially,theimpactoftheDelawarerulingonmanagers’riskaversionandthefollow-upincreaseinequityincentives(tomitigatetheincreaseinmanagers’riskaversionfollowingtheruling)mayhaveresultedinastructuralchangeinoursampleatleastforfirmsincorporatedinDelaware.Tocontrolforthispotentialstructuralimpact,weperformouranalysisforDelawareincorporatedfirmsforI.IXIXVI–II00VIIseparately.OurresultssuggestthatthefavorableeffectofCEOequityincentivesonfirmvalue(asreflectedinthelowerexanteequityriskpremium)issimilarforDelawarefirmsandotherfirms.
Second,anumberofstudies(e.g.,Cohenetal.II00VII,II00VIII;Lietal.II00VIII)indicatethattheII00IISarbanes–OxleyAct(SOX)loweredequityincentives(i.e.,reducedtheproportionofequityincentivestototalcompensationpost-SOX),reducedmanagerialrisktaking,decreasedspendingonR&Dandcapitalexpenditures,andreducedaccruals-basedearningsmanagementwhileincreasingrealearningsmanagement.Sincerealearningsmanagementispotentiallymoredifficultforinvestorstodetectthanaccruals-basedearningsmanagement,apossibleconsequenceofSOXcouldbeanincreaseinagencycostssinceII00II.TocontrolforthepotentialstructuralchangesimposedbySOXbothintermsofexpectedreturnsandthelevelofequityincentives,weperformouranalysisforthepre-SOXandpost-SOXtimeperiodsseparately.Foreachofthetwotimeperiods,ourresultssuggestafavorableeffectofCEOequityincentivesonfirmvalue(asreflectedinthelowerexanteequityriskpremium),althoughtheeffectappearstobestrongerinthepost-SOXperiod.
Ourstudycontributestotheliteratureonthevaluationofequityincentives.Weprovide(toourknowledge)first-timeevidenceontherelationbetweenCEOequityincentivesandtheexantecostofequitycapital.Priorresearchhasfocusedbyandlargeontheconsequencesofmanagerialequityincentivesforfirmperformance(MehranI.IXIXV;Hanlonetal.II00III)andrisktaking(RajgopalandShevlinII00II;Colesetal.II00VI;Hanlonetal.II00IV)ratherthanonvaluationperse.Asnotedpreviously,toourknowledgeonlytwopriorstudies(AboodyI.IXIXVIandMehranI.IXIXV,bothbasedonpre-I.IXIXI.data)haveexaminedthepricingofmanagerialequityincentives,withmixedresults.
Inourstudy,weprovideevidenceonthevaluationeffectsofCEOequityincentivesbasedonmorerecent(I.IXIXII–II00VII)data.Byfocusingonmorerecentdata,ourfindingsrelatetoagrowinglineofresearchontheassociationbetweenequity-basedcompensationandaccountinginformationquality.Specifically,Coffee(II00IV)suggeststhatthe$I.millionlimitonthetaxdeductibilityofcashcompensationforseniorexecutivesimposedbyCongressinI.IXIXIIImotivatedfirmstomakegreateruseofequitycompensationwhich,inturn,increasedthesensitivityofmanagerstothefirm’sstockprice.BergstresserandPhilippon(II00VI)andChengandWarfield(II00V)provideevidencewhichsuggeststhatequityincentivesarepositivelyrelatedtothemagnitudeofaccruals-basedearningsmanagement.Similarly,BurnsandKedia(II00VI)andEfendietal.(II00VII)reportCEOequityincentivestobepositivelyrelatedtoaccountingirregularitiesandthesubsequentrestatementofpreviouslyissuedfinancialstatements.Thus,priorresearchsuggeststhatequity-basedcompensationhasanegativeeffectonthequalityofearningsreportedbyfirms.Consistentwithseveralpublishedempiricalstudiesthatsupportthenotionthatlowerinformationqualityispricedinahighercostofequitycapital(e.g.,Bhattacharyaetal.II00III;Francisetal.II00V),CEOequityincentivescouldpotentiallylowerfirmvaluebyincreasingthefirm-specificequityriskpremium.
Asnotedpreviously,wedocumentthatCEOequityincentives(despitetheassociatedlowerinformationquality)arerelatednegativelytothefirm’sexanteequityriskpremium,implyingthatequityincentivesincreasefirmvaluebyloweringthefirm’scostofequitycapital.Thus,ourfindingssuggestthatthepositiveCEO-shareholderincentivealignmenteffectassociatedwithequityincentivesdominatesthedysfunctionalinformationqualityeffect.
SinceI.IXIXII,theSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)hasmandatedthepublicdisclosureofexecutivecompensationdatatopromoteinformeddecisionmakingbyinvestors.Our?ndingsprovidefurtherevidencethatthesedisclosuresincreasetheinformativenessofstockpricesincompetitivesecuritiesmarkets.Collectively,giventhatCEOcompensationisatopicofongoinginterest(Jensenetal.II00IV;ReichII00VII),our?ndingsindicatethatCEOequityincentivesin?uence?rmvaluefavorablythroughacostofequitycapitalchannel.
Concludingremarks
Priorresearch(e.g.,GoldmanandSlezakII00VI;Jensenetal.II00IV)suggeststhatCEOequityincentivescanbeadouble-edgedsword.Ontheonehand,theseincentivescanmitigatetheagencyproblembyaligningtheinterestsoftheCEOwiththoseoftheshareholders(i.e.,byinducingCEOstoprefermoreoptimal,albeitrisky,investmentchoices).Ontheotherhand,theseincentivescanleadtoexcessivesensitivitytosharepriceperformanceandinduceexecutivestomanipulatereportedearningswithaneyeonthestockprice.Inotherwords,bypromotingperversereportingincentivesandloweringthequalityofaccountinginformationpertinenttoinvestorpricingdecisions,CEOequityincentivescanpotentiallybeapartof,notaremedyfor,theagencyproblem.However,toourknowledgethereislittletonopriorevidencetosuggestwhicheffect_thepositiveincentivealignmenteffectortheperverseinformationqualityeffect_dominates.
Wecontributetotheliteratureinseveralways.First,weshowthatCEOequityincentivesarenegativelyrelatedtothefirm-specificequityriskpremium,i.e.,thepositiveincentivealignmenteffectassociatedwiththeseincentivesdominatesthedysfunctionalinformationqualityeffectinthepricingofthefirm-specificexanteequityriskpremium.Second,sinceequityincentivesareintendedtoinduceCEOstomakemoreoptimal(albeitrisky)investmentdecisions,theeffectoftheseincentivesonshareholderwealthinthepost-SOXtimeperiodisofparticularinterest.Ourresultssuggestthattheeconomicsignificanceoftheseincentives(i.e.,thepayoffforshareholdersintermsofalowerexanteequityriskpremiumandahigherfirmvalue)wasinfacthigherinthepost-SOXtimeperiod.Finally,ourfindingsprovidefurtherevidencethattheSECmandateddisclosures(sinceI.IXIXII)ofexecutivecompensationdataincreasestheinformativenessofstockpriceswithrespecttothepotentialimplicationsofCEOequityincentivesforthecostofequitycapitalandfirmvalue.Atthistime,CEOcompensationisatopicofongoinginterestforregulatorsandinvestors(Jensenetal.II00IV;ReichII00VII).Collectively,ourfindingscomplementandextendpriorresearchonequityincentives.TheyarepotentiallyusefulinbetterinformingregulatorsandinvestorsfacedwithquestionsaboutthepossibleconsequencesofCEOequityincentivesforshareholderwealth.
版权保护: 本文由 hbsrm.com编辑，转载请保留链接: www.hbsrm.com/lwqt/wxzs/23.html
